Except
for those few stones that have been permanently lost,
every diamond that has been found and cut into a gem
since the beginning of time still exists today. This
historic inventory, which overhangs the market, is literally
in the public's hands. Some hundred million women wear
diamonds on their person, while millions of others keep
them in safe deposit boxes or strong boxes as family
heirlooms. It is conservatively estimated that the public
holds more than five hundred million carats of gem diamonds
in this above-the ground inventory, which is more than
fifty times the number of gem diamonds produced by the
diamond cartel in any given year. Since the quantity
of diamonds needed for engagement rings and other jewelry
each year is satisfied by the production from the world's
mines, this prodigious half billion carat overhang of
diamonds must be prevented from ever being put on the
market. The moment a significant portion of the public
began selling diamonds from this inventory, the price
of diamonds could not be sustained. For the diamond
invention to survive, the public must be psychologically
inhibited from ever parting with their diamonds.
In developing a strategy
for De Beers in 1953, N. W. Ayer noted: "Diamonds do
not wear out and are nor consumed. New diamonds add
to the existing supply in trade channels and in the
possession of the public. In our opinion old diamonds
are in 'safe hands' only when widely dispersed and held
by individuals as cherished possessions valued far above
their market price." The advertising agency's basic
assignment was to make women value diamonds as permanent
possessions, not for their actually worth on the market.
It set out to accomplish this task by attempting through
subtly designed advertisements to foster a sentimental
attachment to diamonds which would make it difficult
for a woman to give them up. Women were induced to think
of their diamonds as their "best friends." As far as
De Beers and N. W. Ayer were concerned, "safe hands"
belonged to those women psychologically conditioned
never to sell their diamonds.
This conditioning could
not be attained solely by placing advertisements in
magazines. The diamond-holding public, which included
individuals who inherit diamonds, had to remain convinced
that diamonds retained their monetary value. If they
saw price fluctuations in the diamond market and attempted
to dispose of them to take advantage of these changing
prices, the retail market would become chaotic. It was
therefore essential that at least the illusion of price
stability be maintained.
The extremely delicate
positioning of the "overhang" provides one of the main
rationalizations for the cartel arrangement. Harry Oppenheimer
explained the unique situation of diamonds in the following
terms: "A degree of control is necessary for the well
being of the industry, not because production is excessive
or demand is falling, but simply because wide fluctuations
in price, which have, rightly or wrongly, been accepted
as normal in the case of most raw materials, would be
destructive of public confidence in the case of a pure
luxury such as gem diamonds, of which large stocks are
held in the form of jewelry by the general public."
During the periods when the production from the mines
temporarily exceeds the consumption of diamonds, which
is determined mainly by the number of impending marriages
in the United States and Japan, the cartel can preserve
the vital illusion of price stability by either cutting
back the distribution of diamonds at its London sights
or by itself buying back diamonds at the wholesale level.
The underlying assumption is that as long as the general
public never sees the price of diamonds fall, they will
not become nervous and begin selling the hundreds of
millions of carats worth of diamonds that they hold
from prior production. If this overhang ever reached
the market, even De Beers and all the Oppenheimer resources
could not prevent the price of diamonds from plummeting.
Before the advent of
the twentieth century and the mass marketing of diamonds,
the "overhang," though it existed, was far less of an
imminent danger. Diamonds were then considered to be
the almost exclusive possession of the aristocrats and
wealthy elite, who were not expected to precipitously
sell their jewels-except under the direst circumstances.
In times of revolution, however, this stock did threaten
to come cascading onto the market. When the Czar of
Russia was deposed in 1917, the Bolsheviks announced
that they were selling the mass of diamonds that his
family had accumulated over the centuries. The fear
that this stockpile of diamonds would come onto the
market depressed world diamond prices for over a year.
Then Solly Joel, the nephew and heir of Barney Barnato,
who controlled the diamond syndicate in London, offered
the Bolsheviks one quarter million pounds for the entire
hoard sight unseen. The Bolsheviks, desperately in need
of cash to finance their revolution, accepted the offer,
and delivered the diamonds in fourteen cigar boxes to
London. Joel then assured the other diamond merchants
that he would keep these diamonds off the market for
years, and panic subsided.
With the bulk of the
diamonds in the hands of the general public, the problem
of the overhang became much more difficult to handle.
When the demand for diamonds almost completely abated
after the crash of 1929, De Beers shut down the supply
of diamonds by closing its mines and buying the production
of independent mines for its stockpile in London. It
could not, however, prevent diamonds from the overhang
seeping into the market. Prices for small gems fell
to $5 a carat. De Beers, already heavily in debt, continued
through the 1930s to borrow money to buy back as many
of these diamonds as it could absorb. But despite all
these efforts, enough of the overhang came onto the
market to make it impossible for jewelers to buy back
diamonds. Public confidence in diamonds as a store of
value was nearly destroyed, especially in Europe, and
it required more than a generation before diamonds were
again to reach their 1929 price level.
In the 1960s, the overhang
again threatened to pour onto the market when the Soviet
Union began to sell its polished diamonds. De Beers
and its allies now no longer controlled the diamond
supply. De Beers realized that open competition with
the Russians would inevitably lead to "price fluctuations,"
as Harry Oppenheimer gingerly put it. This, in turn,
would undoubtedly weaken the public's carefully cultivated
confidence in the value of diamonds. Since Oppenheimer
assumed that neither party could afford risking the
destruction of the diamond invention, he offered the
Soviets a straightforward deal: "a single channel" for
controlling the world supply of diamonds. In accepting
this arrangement, the Russians became partners in the
cartel, and co- protectors of the diamond invention.
De Beers then devised the "eternity ring," made up of
hundreds of tiny Soviet-sized diamonds, which could
be sold to an entirely new market of married women.
The advertising campaign designed by N. W. Ayer was
based on the theme of recaptured love. Again, sentiments
were born out of necessity: American wives received
a snake-like ring of miniature diamonds because of the
needs of a South African corporation to accommodate
the Communist Russia.
As the flow of Soviet
diamonds continued into London at an ever-increasing
rate, De Beers strategists came to the conclusion that
this production could not be entirely absorbed by "eternity
rings" or other new concepts in jewelry. They began
looking for diamond markets for miniature diamonds outside
the confines of the United States. Even though they
succeeded beyond their wildest expectation in creating
an instant diamond "tradition" in Japan, they were unable
to create similar traditions in Brazil, Germany, Austria
or Italy. Despite the cost involved in absorbing this
hoard of Soviet diamonds each year, De Beers prevented,
at least temporarily, the Soviet Union from taking any
precipitous actions that might cause the diamond overhang
to start sliding down onto the market.
Another threat came
in 1977. Sir Philip Oppenheimer and other De Beers executives
became concerned about the buildup of Israeli stockpiles
of uncut diamonds in Tel Aviv. Most of these diamonds
had been pledged as collateral for loans with which
the dealers bought still more diamonds. The Israeli
banks, who had lent nearly one-third of all of Israel's
foreign exchange on the diamonds, began asking the dealers
to repay the loans. To do this, however, dealers would
have to sell their diamonds, which could cause an abrupt
drop in the price. And if the price began dropping,
the banks themselves might be forced to liquidate the
remaining stockpiles of diamonds, causing the sort of
panic in the diamond market that could conceivably unsettle
the overhang.
After establishing
liaisons with the Israeli banks, De Beers executives
worked out what one of its chief brokers termed "a billion
dollar squeeze play." First, De Beers reduced the number
of diamonds provided to the Israeli dealers at the London
sights. Then, through a special surcharge, De Beers
actually increased the price the dealers had to pay.
To get the cash for these diamonds, the latter were
forced to reduce their inventories. Meanwhile, De Beers'
publicity department churned out a series of press releases
about new surcharges and rising prices that distracted
attention from the fluctuation in wholesale prices.
Before the year ended, according to Jewelers' Circular
Keystone, about 350 Israeli dealers, unable to repay
their loans, were forced into bankruptcy. The wholesale
price, cushioned by De Beers' buying the Israeli operations,
wavered but did not collapse. By 1979, stockpile had
been successfully dispersed.
The most serious threat
to the stability of the diamond overhang came in the
1980s from the sale of "investment" diamonds to speculators
in the United States. De Beers had methodically nurtured
the idea in America that diamonds were not subject to
the vagaries of price that affected other consumer luxuries.
To maintain this illusion in the public's mind, De Beers
made it a si . ne qua non condition of its marketing
strategy that retail prices should never fall. Price
competition between major retailers of diamonds was
prohibited by the rules of the game prices. Jewelers'
Circular Keystone, which interviewed dozens of leading
retailers in 1979, explained:
"If the giant retailers
ever declared a predatory price war on 'mom and pop'
competitors and each other, they could destroy the image
of diamonds as a commodity that always appreciates in
value. . . . So a tacit unwritten agreement with De
Beers forbids such privileged retailers from engaging
in predatory price wars." Under this system, nationwide
Jewelry chains, though they get their diamonds either
directly from De Beers or a De Beers sight-holder at
a lower price, do not attempt to undercut the small
jewelry shop (which acquires its diamonds on consignments
at much higher prices). What varies is the profit and
markup, not the retail price. As long as individuals
do not attempt to resell their diamonds and thereby
discover the enormous difference in markups, or "keystones,"
as they are called in the trade, it is possible to retain
the appearance of stable and gradually increasing prices.
The situation radically
changed when the more unsavory sales organizations began
selling millions of carats of " investment" diamonds
to men who had no sentimental attachment to the diamonds
themselves and acquired them solely for the purpose
of reselling them at a higher price. They were not even
mounted as jewelry. By 1980, it was estimated that American
investors had paid more than a billion dollars for these
diamonds. Moreover, many of the companies that had sold
the diamonds with the guarantee of a "buy-back" at a
fixed price had either gone bankrupt or simply closed
their offices and disappeared.
The diamond cartel
managed had to absorb or get control over these private
stockpiles to prevent them from cascading onto the market
and unhinge the entire overhang. If they had not, the
illusion would shatter. As one dealer explained, "Investment
diamonds are bought for $30,000 a carat, not because
any women want to wear them on their fingers, but because
the investor believes they will be worth $50,000 a carat.
He may borrow heavily to finance his investment. When
the price begins to decline, everyone will try to sell
their diamonds at once. In the end, of course, there
will be no buyers for diamonds at $30,000. At this point,
there will be a stampede to sell investment diamonds,
and the newspapers will begin writing stories about
the great diamond crash." When women read about a diamond
crash, some might attempt to see their own, but find
few buyers. At that point, people will realize that
diamonds are not forever.
Whether this pessimistic
scenario ever unfolds remains to be seen. De Beers has
billions of dollars of its cash reserves to buy back
diamonds,. Nevertheless, with new diamond mines in Australia
and Canada coming on stream, the time is past when De
Beers can manipulate prices merely through the expedient
of shutting down mines.
The diamond invention
is neither eternal nor self-perpetuating. It survived
for the past half century because two critical conditions
were satisfied: the production of diamonds from the
world's mines was kept in balance with world consumption;
and the public refrained from attempting to sell its
inventory back onto the market. De Beers satisfied the
first of these conditions by owning and controlling
the major sources of diamonds and the second of these
conditions by fostering the illusion in the public's
mind that diamonds are forever. Both achievements may
prove to be temporary phenomena. The diamond craze of
the twentieth century could end as abruptly as the tulip
mania of the eighteenth century. Under these circumstances,
the diamond invention will disintegrate and be remembered
only as a historical curiosity, as brilliant in its
way as the glittering, brittle, little stones it once
made so valuable.
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